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TAKINGS BY FLOODWATERS
ALAN ROMERO*
Causing water to flood private land has long been recognized as one
way that government may "take" land for public use, thereby requiring
"just compensation" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In
fact, the Supreme Court's first takings decision, although decided under
a state just compensation clause, held that Wisconsin had to pay just
compensation for private land that a dam caused to be flooded.'
Takings law has come a long way since then. Yet many courts
continue to recite and apply the same rules for determining when
flooding is a taking. In this article, I reconsider those rules in light of
current takings law. I conclude that since floodwaters physically invade
land, government-caused flooding is a taking regardless of how frequent,
lasting, or damaging the flooding may be. However, the government
does not take private property by flooding if the common law would
have allowed a similarly situated private owner to cause such flooding
without liability.
Part I briefly describes the circumstances in which the government
may take land by causing flooding. Part II rebuts the traditional rule
that government-caused flooding takes private property only if the
flooding is permanent or inevitably recurring. Part III rebuts the tradi-
tional rule that government-caused flooding takes private property only
if the flooding prevents all beneficial use or causes substantial damage.
Part IV then discusses the only legitimate limitations on government
liability for taking property by flooding, the common law rules allowing
flooding without liability. Finally, Part V argues that, despite mostly
contrary takings law, a landowner should be able to recover compensa-
tion immediately upon the completion of government works that threat-
en flooding, rather than having to wait until flooding actually occurs.
I. TAKINGS BY FLOODWATERS
The government may cause flooding on private land in many
different ways. Sometimes the flooding is permanent and deliberate, as
when the government builds a dam that inundates land above the dam.2
The government may build levees or other flood control systems that it
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law. B.A., Brigham Young
University, 1990; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1993.
1. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 180-81 (1871).
2. See, e.g., id.
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expects to cause or intensify flooding in certain areas at certain times,
but not to permanently flood land. 3 The government may alter water-
courses for navigation or flood control.4 Local governments may fore-
seeably cause flooding by constructing drainage and sewer systems that
increase the flow of water through watercourses or alter drainage patterns
of surface water. 5 Inadequate maintenance and poor design of sewer
and drainage systems may cause unexpected flooding. 6 The govern-
ment's flood control actions when floods threaten may cause flooding
on land that otherwise would not have been flooded, or at least flooded
less severely. 7 Flooding also may occur when the government paves or
raises roads, causing surface water to collect on adjacent land.8
If the government foresees that flooding may occur, it may con-
demn the property, or an easement on the property, so that it may flood
the property as required by the project. 9 But government flood control
projects may cause flooding on land that the government does not
formally condemn. This can happen for many reasons. The govern-
ment may decide that, although a project may increase the risk of
flooding on certain lands, the risk is not so great that flood easements are
necessary for those lands, or that the owner is otherwise not entitled to
compensation.10 The government simply may not foresee the flooding,
3. See, e.g., Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 277-80 (1939) (describing federal project to
control flooding of the Mississippi River).
4. See, e.g., City of Globe v. Shute, 196 P. 1024, 1027 (Ariz. 1921) (holding that city was liable
for negligently diverting a natural waterway).
5. See, e.g., Masley v. City of Lorain, 358 N.E.2d 596, 599-600 (Ohio 1976) (requiring city to
pay just compensation for storm sewer system that caused flooding on downstream riparian lands).
6. See, e.g., Associates of Meadow Lake, Inc. v. City of Edgewater, 706 So. 2d 50, 50 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998); Columbia County v. Doolittle, 512 S.E.2d 236, 238 (Ga. 1999).
7. See, e.g., South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Basore of Florida, Inc., 723 So. 2d 287, 288 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (describing plaintiff's contention that water management district took plaintiff's
damaged crops by not lowering canal levels before storm).
8. See, e.g., Poe v. State Road Dep't, 127 So. 2d 898, 898-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Heins
Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)
(describing flooding resulting from inadequate culvert under highway bypass); State ex rel. Missouri
Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. Horine, 776 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Mo. 1989) (en banc); Stewart v. State, 669
N.Y.S.2d 723, 723-24 (App. Div. 1998).
9. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 593 (1994) ("Whenever any State ... shall undertake to secure any land
or easement therein, needed in connection with a work of river and harbor improvement duly autho-
rized by Congress, . . .the Secretary of the Army may, in his discretion, cause proceedings to be
instituted in the name of the United States for the acquirement by condemnation of said land or
easement .... ); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.250 (Michie 1998) (authorizing condemnation of fee simple
for permanent flooding caused by reservoirs and dams); CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1240.110(a) (West
1999) (generally authorizing condemnation of flowage and flooding easements); IND. CODE § 14-28-
1-11 (1995) (authorizing flood control commission to condemn flooding easements if unable to
negotiate purchase); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.33708 (1999) (authorizing condemnation of easements
for flood control and drainage projects); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-104 (1999) (authorizing
condemnation of interests in land for flooding caused by dams and reservoirs); Danforth, 308 U.S. at
279-80 (relating government offer to purchase then condemnation of a flooding easement on private
land).
10. See, e.g., Horine, 776 S.W.2d at 9 (relating commission's argument that landowner was not
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whether because it miscalculates the effects of a flood control project or
because unforeseen circumstances require unexpected action or cause
unexpected results.ll The government also may construct or operate a
project negligently, causing flooding on lands that otherwise would not
have been flooded.1 2 Or the government may simply avoid adding to
the expense of a project and try to get away with not acquiring necessary
flood easements.
Of course, if the government negligently constructs flood control or
drainage systems, it may be liable in tort for the foreseeable consequenc-
es of its negligence.13 It may also be liable for trespass. But a govern-
ment may be immune from such tort liability. 14 The federal government
may be immune under the Flood Control Act of 1928, which states that
"[nlo liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States
for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place."1 5 The
courts continue to debate the scope of this immunity, but it may be very
broad.16 Even if the governmental defendant is not immune, some
courts say that the flooded plaintiff may not sue for tort damages against
an entity with eminent domain power, because inverse condemnation is
the proper remedy.17 Procedural requirements for tort actions against
the government also may prevent tort claims.18
But governments are never immune from constitutional claims for
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 19 If a tort action is
entitled to compensation because any increased risk of flooding was not a taking); Masley, 358 N.E.2d
at 598 (relating city's argument that owner was not entitled to compensation because city had common
law right to cause flooding).
11. See, e.g., Hawkins v. City of La Grande, 843 P.2d 400, 402 (Or. 1992) (describing city's
emergency discharge of effluent because of weather conditions).
12. See, e.g., South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 723 So. 2d at 288 (describing plaintiffs conten-
tion that district negligently managed its flood control system); Stewart, 669 N.Y.S.2d at 723-24
(describing plaintiffs contention that city caused flooding by negligently constructing and maintaining
roads).
13. See City of Globe v. Shute, 196 P. 1024 (Ariz. 1921) (holding that city was liable for
negligently diverting a natural waterway); Hadfield v. Oakland County Drain Comm'r, 422 N.W.2d
205 (Mich. 1988) (finding trespass-nuisance exception to local government immunity).
14. See WASH. REV. CODE § 86.12.037 (1996) ("No action shall be brought or maintained against
any county.., relating to the improvement, protection, regulation and control for flood prevention and
navigation purposes of any river or its tributaries and the beds, banks and waters thereof ...."); City
of Round Rock v. Smith, 687 S.W.2d 300, 301-03 (Tex. 1985) (holding that city was immune from tort
liability for approving subdivision plat that specified filling of natural watercourse, which led to
flooding of private property).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (1994).
16. See, e.g., Central Green Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing dis-
agreement over scope of immunity, and concluding that the federal government is immune from
liability for any flooding resulting from a part of a project with the authorized purpose of flood control,
regardless of its actual use and purpose).
17. E.g., Heins Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 693-94
(Mo. 1993) (en banc).
18. See Arneson v. City of Fargo, 303 N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 1981) (holding that property owner
could not pursue claim that government negligently caused flooding because of failure to give
required notice of injury within 90 days).
19. See, e.g., Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 904 (Ct. App. 2000) ("[Tlhe
20001
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unavailable or otherwise unattractive, the landowner may claim that
the government "took" the private property without paying just
compensation as the Fifth Amendment requires. 20
II. EVEN TEMPORARY FLOODING MAY TAKE PROPERTY
A. THE TRADITIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PERMANENCE OR INEVITABLE
RECURRENCE
The first cases involving takings by floodwaters suggested that only
permanent flooding would require just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. In the first such decision by the Supreme Court, Pumpelly
v. Green Bay Co.,21 the Court reasoned that Wisconsin's just compensa-
tion clause 22 must require compensation for such "irreparable and
permanent injury" even though the land, "in the narrowest sense of that
word, is not taken for the public use." 23 Then in Sanguinetti v. United
States,24 the Supreme Court more directly said that government-caused
flooding must be permanent in order to be a taking. The private land in
that case had temporarily flooded several times due to a canal that the
United States designed and built. The Court concluded that, "in order
to create an enforceable liability against the Government .... the over-
flow [must] be the direct result of the structure, and constitute an actual,
permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of and
not merely an injury to the property." 25 Sanguinetti, the Court rea-
soned, "was not ousted, nor was his customary use of the land prevented,
unless for short periods of time." 26 The Court did not explain, however,
why temporary flooding is not a taking, and this was only one of several
reasons for denying compensation to Sanguinetti. 27
Some courts continue to hold that the owner of flooded property
may recover compensation only if the flooding is permanent. A recent
constitutional provisions requiring compensation for property taken or damaged by a public use
overrides the Tort Claims Act and its statutory immunities.").
20. If the government does not formally condemn the property, the property owner must bring an
"inverse condemnation" lawsuit to compel the government to pay just compensation. See, e.g., Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980) ("Inverse condemnation is 'a shorthand description of
the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when
condemnation proceedings have not been instituted."' (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253,
257 (1980))).
21. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
22. The Court in Pumpelly considered only Wisconsin's constitutional provision because, at that
time, it was "well settled" that the federal just compensation clause was a limitation on the power of
the federal government, not on the states. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 176-77
(1871).
23. Id. at 177-78.
24. 264 U.S. 146 (1924).
25. Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924).
26. Id.
27. See id. at 149-50.
788 [VOL. 76:785
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Florida case, for example, held that a taking claim requires proof that
government-caused flooding "permanently deprived" the landowner of
"all beneficial use of its property." 28 Other recent decisions likewise
continue to state that flooding is a taking only if permanent. 29
Permanent flooding certainly looks most like a taking. If the
government causes water to invade land permanently, the flooding has
the same effect as a permanent physical occupation by the public. The
landowner loses most if not all use of her flooded property. And the
government uses the property for public use, whether intentionally or
not, by diverting water onto the property to avoid flooding in other areas
or to serve other public interests.
However, since Pumpelly and Sanguinetti, the Supreme Court and
some other courts have acknowledged that land may be taken by less
than permanent flooding. In United States v. Cress,30 the Supreme Court
reasoned that
it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage
resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, that
determines the question whether it is a taking.... There is no
difference of kind, but only of degree, between a permanent
condition of continual overflow by backwater and a permanent
liability to intermittent but inevitably recurring overflows; and,
on principle, the right to compensation must arise in the one
case as in the other.31
The Court therefore held that recurring temporary flooding required just
compensation, although the compensation was for taking a flooding ease-
ment, rather than for taking title to the land. 32 But the Court did not ex-
plain how intermittent and inevitably recurring overflows differ in kind,
rather than just in degree, from overflows that are not certain to recur.
The injury that actually occurs, after all, is the same kind of injury in
28. Diamond K Corp. v. Leon County, 677 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam).
29. See South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Basore, Inc., 723 So. 2d 287, 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998); Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 822 (Minn. 1984) (stating that flooding is a taking
only if it creates a permanent servitude by intermittent flooding of indefinite duration); Vern Reynolds
Constr., Inc. v. City of Champlin, 539 N.W.2d 614, 619 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (suggesting that if
drainage onto private land is a temporary flood control measure, it would only be a trespass or
nuisance claim, because flooding is a taking only if "permanent," that is, "of indefinite duration");
Stewart v. State, 669 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (App. Div. 1998) ("[W]here the interference with property
rights is only temporary, casual, or intermittent, without any permanent use or appropriation or
destruction of an existing right, there is a mere trespass and not a taking." (quoting 51 N.Y. Jur. 2d,
Eminent Domain § 88, at 135)).
30. 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
31. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).
32. Id. at 329 ("[W]here ... land is not constantly but only at intervals overflowed, the fee may
be permitted to remain in the owner, subject to an easement in the United States to overflow it with
water as often as necessarily may result from the operation .... ").
2000] 789
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either case, although it may differ in degree because it differs in frequen-
cy. Furthermore, land value and development may be impaired in either
case, because one cannot be sure in the present whether the flooding will
recur, even if the land has flooded only once. Nevertheless, other courts
have followed Cress in declaring that impermanent flooding may be a
taking only if it is "intermittent, frequent, and inevitably recurring." 33
B. EXPLANATIONS FOR REQUIRING PERMANENCE OR INEVITABLE
RECURRENCE
1. Consequential Injury
Some courts have justified this distinction between occasional floods
and permanent or frequently recurring floods on the theory that oc-
casional flooding is "mere consequential injury, or tort," resulting from
lawful police power activity, which many different kinds of cases say is
not compensable under the Takings Clause.34
This argument may make sense if the property owner claims a
taking because of injury to her property. That is, if the owner argues
that, although the government did not actually seize her property, it still
took her property by damaging it. In that case, one can reason that mere
injury to land does not take the land away unless the injury is so exten-
sive that it is practically equivalent to a taking.35
33. Cooper v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 28, 36 (1996); accord Barnes v. United States, 538 F.2d
865, 870-71 (Ct. Cl. 1976) ("Generally speaking, property may be taken by the invasion of water
where subjected to intermittent, but inevitably recurring, inundation due to authorized Government
action."); Bennett v. Tarrant County Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. One, 894 S.W.2d 441, 449 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1995). 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.06[2][c] (1999) summarizes courts' decisions on
this issue as follows:
There is no absolute rule regarding the magnitude or duration of flooding necessary to
constitute a taking. It appears to be generally recognized that a single flood of short
duration, or occasional temporary flowage, is not sufficient to constitute a taking.
Conversely, substantial periodic flooding, coupled with a likelihood of recurrence, has
been held to constitute a taking .... Yet even this distinction may be easier to state than
to apply. Most formulations of the rule speak of permanent invasions, even though
"predictable periodicity" appears to be an acceptable substitute for "permanency."
34. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 132, 139-40 (1990) (holding that CIA's operation
of investment banking firm did not take plaintiffs' property because the firm did not directly cause
plaintiffs' losses); Hartwig v. United States, 485 F.2d 615, 620 (Ct. Cl. 1973) ("Without this essential
element [inevitable recurrence], the court has no choice but to find that the plaintiffs have at best
presented a case of consequential injury due to governmental action, which would be an essentially
tortious injury."); Barnes, 538 F.2d at 870; Whitney v. Heckler, 603 F. Supp. 821, 826-27 (N.D. Ga.
1985) (holding that freeze on Medicare fees was not a taking but merely a consequential injury from
lawful regulation).
35. Some courts have also said that flooding caused by negligent operation of government
improvements, rather than flooding caused by their intended operation, is merely a tort and not a
taking. See Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 906 (Ct. App. 2000) ("[A] claim
for an injury caused by police powers activities, or by negligence in the routine operation of the
improvement that is not related to the function of the project as conceived, is subject to the rules and
790 [VOL. 76:785
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But this argument does not make sense with flooding. Government-
caused flooding is a taking because it occupies the land and dispossesses
the owner, not because it damages the land. It may be hard to imagine
an analogous situation, but it would be something like the government
constructing a building that encroaches on private property, then remov-
ing the building later. The government would have taken that part of the
property from the owner and would have to pay compensation. That is
true even though the seizure may have been temporary and the conse-
quence of a lawful police power activity. That would also be true even if
the government did not intend to take the property, but genuinely be-
lieved that the land was its own, whether because of negligence in search-
ing title or in choosing the building site when it began construction. In
United States v. Cress, the Supreme Court seemed to acknowledge that
government-caused flooding is a taking because of the invasion, not the
injury. The Court held that flooding caused by a lock and dam on navi-
gable waterways required just compensation to landowners, distinguish-
ing other cases denying compensation in which "there was no direct
invasion of the lands of the claimants [and] the damages were altogether
consequential." 36
So it is wrong to say that isolated or infrequent flooding cannot be a
taking because it is merely consequential injury or tort. It is a physical
invasion of the land just as frequent flooding is, regardless of whether it
results from lawful police power activity. 37
2. Necessary to Infer Flooding Easement
Some courts have suggested that flooding must be at least frequent
and recurring because only then can the government be said to have
immunities of the Tort Claims Act, which are not obviated by recasting the claim as an inverse
condemnation claim."). This argument likewise makes sense if the taking is based on the extent of
injury. But, as I argue in this section, a physical seizure or occupation of property is a taking
regardless of whether the government does so intentionally, negligently, or even innocently. Cases
like Pacific Bell incorrectly limit takings claims in this way because they implicitly reason that flooding
is a taking because it damages the property rather than because it physically seizes and occupies the
property.
36. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327 (1917).
37. Some state constitutions might offer another rebuttal to this traditional limitation on takings by
floodwaters. Many state constitutions say that the government must pay compensation for property
"taken or damaged for a public use." Such a clause might require compensation for any damage
foreseeably resulting from public works or other government acts. However, some states have
construed such clauses to mean merely that the government must pay for consequential damages
resulting from the exercise of the eminent domain power. See Wilson v. City of Fargo, 141 N.W.2d
727, 730 (N.D. 1965) (reasoning that "taken or damaged" clause requires compensation for damages
that exercise of eminent domain power causes to untaken property). Under such a construction, the
state clause would not differ from the federal clause as to whether property damage from exercises of
the police power would be compensable. Even then, however, at least it would be more certain that
the government must pay compensation when construction of flood control improvements and the like
causes flooding on other land.
2000]
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taken a flooding easement requiring compensation. For example, the
Federal Circuit has said that
"[p]roperty is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads
are made upon an owner's use of it to an extent that, as be-
tween private parties, a servitude has been acquired either by
agreement or in course of time." . . . [T]o show a servitude
has been imposed through a taking by flooding, a plaintiff
must prove that the land is subject to permanent or inevitably
recurring floods.38
It is certainly true that one could not claim compensation for a
flooding easement unless one showed some likelihood that the flooding
would recur. If the flooding were unlikely to recur, there would be no
reason to require the government to pay for an easement and acquire the
right to flood the land in the future, not just in the past.
But that does not help decide whether even a single government-
caused flood has taken land, although only temporarily. If such a flood
is a taking, then the owner should receive just compensation for that
taking. The compensation obviously would be less than the compen-
sation required if the government had effectively taken the land not just
on one or a few specific instances, but had also taken the right to keep
flooding the land intermittently in the future. But it may still be a
completed taking in the past even if it does not amount to a practical
condemnation of an ongoing flooding easement.
3. Flooding as Regulation
The prevailing rule, that flooding must be at least frequent and
inevitably recurring in order to be a taking, also might make sense if
flooding were considered to be a sort of land-use regulation. A regula-
tion takes land, even though the government does not actually take title
to the land, if the regulation unfairly burdens the individual property
owner, depriving the owner of substantial property value for the benefit
of the public. If a property can be valuably used under the common
law, and a regulation deprives the owner of all that value, then the
regulation will always be a taking. 39 Even a regulation that does not
render property useless may take property if the "economic impact of
the regulation" and the "interfere[nce] with distinct investment-backed
38. Turner v. United States, 901 F.2d 1093, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (quoting
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947)); see also Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344
N.W.2d 815, 822 (Minn. 1984) (requiring proof that the flooding has constructively created a
"servitude of indefinite duration").
39. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-18 (1992).
[VOL. 76:785792
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expectations" are great enough. 40 If a regulation does not go "too
far," on the other hand-if it does not impose too substantial and
unique a burden on the landowner-then it does not take the land. 41 If
flooding is like regulation, then flooding should be considered a taking
only if it imposes too substantial a burden on the individual land owner.
A single flood, or maybe any flooding that is only temporary and
sporadic, might be considered a reasonable burden on a landowner if she
can still use the property beneficially, although the landowner would
surely disagree. At least it would make sense to say that at some point
flooding may become so minimal that it does not take property and
require compensation.
But flooding is not like regulation. Land-use regulations are treated
differently from physical seizures of land because regulations do not
directly invade and use the property. The government takes and uses the
property only in a negative sense: by restraining the owner's use of the
property somehow, the government benefits those who would be ad-
versely affected by the restrained use. If that restraint is great enough,
then it may be considered equivalent to seizure and use. But flooding
does not work like regulation. Flooding does not benefit the public by
restraining the owner's use of the property. The practical limitation on
the owner's ability to use her property does not benefit the public at all.
Rather, flooding benefits the public by actually, physically invading and
using the property to hold water that otherwise would flood other land or
would be captured and held on land owned by the government. The
government physically excludes the property owner from the flooded
land. Flooding therefore is like building a structure on land, or occupy-
ing land with government personnel, not like merely restraining the
owner's use of the land. For example, if the government were to build a
power station on vacant private land without paying for the land, the
government clearly would have taken the land, but not by "regulation."
Deliberately putting water on land is not different from deliberately
putting structures on land.
The Supreme Court suggested this equivalence in another early
case involving takings by floodwaters, United States v. Great Falls
Manufacturing Co.42
It seems clear that these property rights have been held and used
by the agents of the United States, under the sanction of
40. Id. at 1019 n.8; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
41. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("[Wlhile property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
42. 112 U.S. 645 (1884).
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legislative enactments by congress; for the appropriation of
money specifically for the construction of the dam . . . was, all
the circumstances considered, equivalent to an express direction
by the legislative and executive branches of the government to
its officers to take this particular property for the public objects
contemplated by the scheme for supplying the capital of the
nation with wholesome water. The making of the improvements
necessarily involves the taking of the property .... 43
Although the Supreme Court decided Pumpelly long before the birth of
regulatory takings, the Court's first takings decision also reflects this
perspective on takings by floodwaters. The Court acknowledged that
compensation may not be required for "consequential injury to the
property of the individual arising from the prosecution of improvements
of roads, streets, rivers, and other highways, for the public good," but
that "where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of
water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure
placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a
taking." 44 The Court did not directly say why it might treat "actual
invasion" by "superinduced additions" of water differently from other
causes of lost property value. After all, the Court's justification for
requiring compensation-the equivalence of the injury to the landown-
er-applies just as much to any lost property value. But obviously the
Court believed that an invasion of the land by physical agents like
floodwater differs from other types of injury to land.
Some have argued that physical seizures or invasions of the land
should not be treated differently from regulatory restraints on land.45
The economic consequences may be equivalent, and a regulatory re-
straint can be considered identical to physically taking a negative ease-
ment on the land.46 But regardless of how we treat regulatory restraints
43. United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645, 656 (1884); see also United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327 (1917) (holding that flooding caused by lock and dam on navigable water-
ways required just compensation to landowners, and distinguishing cases in which "there was no direct
invasion of the lands of the claimants [and] the damages were altogether consequential").
44. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 180-81 (1871).
45. See, e.g., Casella v. City of Morgan Hill, 280 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880-81 (Ct. App. 1991);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 602-03 (2d ed. 1988); Ray Mulligan, Comment,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation: Another Excursion into the Takings Dilemma,
17 URB. LAW. 109 (1985); Robert M. DiGiovanni, Note, Eminent Domain-Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.: Permanent Physical Occupation as a Taking, 62 N.C. L. REV. 153 (1983).
46. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184-90 (1967) (arguing that the words
"take" and "property" themselves cannot suggest special treatment of physical invasions, because
restraining a use is also taking a recognized form of property, a negative easement). Michelman does
describe the special offense of a physical invasion which might be thought to justify considering it a
unique type of compensable occasion, but concludes that the degree of harm should be the critical
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or other functional equivalents of condemnation, flooding should be
treated like other physical invasions or seizures of land, not like regula-
tions. As long as courts analyze those two types of acts differently under
the Takings Clause, courts should treat flooding like the former, not the
latter.
C. A TEMPORARY PHYSICAL SEIZURE LIKE GOVERNMENT-CAUSED
FLOODING REQUIRES COMPENSATION
There is a reason for treating physical seizures differently from
regulatory restraints. The core compensable act under the Takings
Clause is when the government takes property away from the owner and
uses the property itself.4 7 The words of the Takings Clause require just
compensation for at least that sort of an act, regardless of what other acts
they also require compensation for. Restraining the use of property
does not do that, but it may be close to equivalent if it restrains the use
too much. So courts have assessed the severity of the restraint when de-
ciding whether it is the practical equivalent of physical seizure. But if
the government's act is actually a physical seizure, there is no reason to
consider whether the act was functionally equivalent to a physical
seizure.
The Supreme Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.48 therefore held that a "permanent physical occupation autho-
rized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests
that it may serve." 49 Citing Pumpelly and other cases, the Court rea-
soned that not only do precedent and tradition require just compensation
for a permanent physical occupation, but that such an occupation ought
to always require compensation because it is "perhaps the most serious
form of invasion." 50 Whether more serious or not, however, occupation
by the government leaves "no question that property has been 'taken
for public use'-after all, the public is using the property." 5 1
Although in dicta, Loretto also indicated that a temporary physical
occupation might not be a taking. The Court distinguished a number of
cases it said dealt with temporary physical invasions rather than perma-
nent physical occupations.5 2 The Court in Loretto only briefly ex-
plained in a footnote why temporary physical invasions should be
determinant. See id. at 1228-29.
47. "The one incontestable case for compensation (short of formal expropriation) seems to occur
when the government deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the public at large, 'regularly' use,
or 'permanently' occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be under private
ownership." Id. at 1184.
48. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
49. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
50. Id. at 435.
51. Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REV. 531, 560 (1995).
52. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428-34.
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treated differently. The Court said that the "rationale is evident:
[temporary physical invasions] do not absolutely dispossess the owner of
his rights to use, and exclude others from, his property." 53 In such
cases, the Court said, "the fact that the government itself commits an
invasion from which it directly benefits is one relevant factor in deter-
mining whether a taking has occurred." 54
The Court understandably did not want to declare a broader rule
than necessary in deciding Loretto. And as discussed above, 55 some inter-
mittent flooding cases did seem to suggest that temporary physical
occupation does not always require just compensation. Still, plenty of
decisions before Loretto suggested that even temporary physical occupa-
tions require just compensation. In United States v. Dickinson,56 for ex-
ample, the Court held that the government had to pay compensation for
flooded land even though the plaintiff had later reclaimed the flooded
land. The Court said that "no use to which Dickinson could subsequent-
ly put the property by his reclamation efforts changed the fact that the
land was taken when it was taken and an obligation to pay for it then
arose." 57 Similarly, in several wartime seizure cases the Court held that
when the government assumed control of a business enterprise, the
government took the property and had to pay just compensation even
though the government ran the business only temporarily. 58 United
States v. Pewee Coal Co.,59 cited in Loretto, concluded that the govern-
ment had to pay just compensation for temporary seizure of a coal mine
to avert a strike. The Court apparently relied entirely on the fact that the
government took "actual possession and control" of the mine, because
the Court did not discuss any other relevant "balancing" factors. 60
Since Loretto, the Court has more clearly indicated that temporary
takings require just compensation. In First English Evangelical Luther-
53. Id. at 435 n.12.
54. Id. at 432 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 128 (1978)).
55. See supra part II.A.
56. 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
57. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947).
58. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1949) (affirming award of rental
value as compensation for temporary possession of a laundry business); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378, 382-83 (1945) (holding that government must pay short-term rental
value of business premises taken temporarily). Cf. YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 92 (1969)
(concluding that temporary occupation by army troops was not a taking because it was to benefit
landowner and because it did not deprive landowner of ability to occupy building anyway, but noting
that "[o]rdinarily, of course, government occupation of private property deprives the private owner of
his use of the property, and it is this deprivation for which the Constitution requires compensation"); J.
LEwis, LAW OF EMINENTDOMAIN INTHE UNITED STATES 197 (1888) ("Any invasion of property, except
in case of necessity . . . , either upon, above or below the surface, and whether temporary or
permanent, is a taking." (footnote omitted)).
59. 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
60. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
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an Church v. County of Los Angeles,61 the Court cited several temporary
seizure cases in concluding that temporary regulatory takings require
just compensation. 62 The Court reasoned that "temporary use and oc-
cupation" takes property from an owner just as permanent occupation
does. 63 The government therefore must compensate the owner for such
a taking.
Although the taking at issue in First English was by regulation, the
same principle surely applies to physical seizures of property as well. 64
Temporary physical seizures may take property just as permanent physi-
cal seizures. Of course, the briefer the invasion, the less compensation
due. If the invasion is short and no injury results, perhaps no compen-
sation may be 'just."65 But there is no reason to say that government-
caused flooding must be permanent, or even of a certain substantial
duration, in order to take private property. 66
III. GOVERNMENT-CAUSED FLOODING MAY TAKE PROPERTY
EVEN IF IT DOES NOT PREVENT ALL BENEFICIAL USE OR
SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGE THE PROPERTY
A. GOVERNMENT-CAUSED FLOODING MAY TAKE PROPERTY EVEN IF
THE OWNER RETAINS SOME BENEFICIAL USE
Some courts also continue to recite that government-caused flood-
ing is a taking only if it deprives the owner of all beneficial use of the
property. 67 Certainly if government-caused flooding does deprive the
owner of all beneficial use, it should be considered a taking if it intrudes
61. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
62. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318
(1987).
63. Id. at 318-19 (quoting United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 26 (1958)).
64. See Associates of Meadow Lake, Inc. v. City of Edgewater, 706 So. 2d 50, 51-52 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that principle of First English allowed taking claim for flooding that was
temporary because remedied by municipality).
65. See, e.g., Clegg, supra note 51, at 546 ("Where the duration is very short, there may be no
just compensation due, simply because the claimant has suffered no injury; indeed, in such cases the
claimant may well lack standing and his claim will be nonjusticiable. But where more than de minimis
injury in fact has been suffered, some amount of compensation will be just.").
66. As some courts have held, a single flood can also take crops, livestock, and other personal
property that is destroyed. See, e.g., Hawkins v. City of La Grande, 843 P.2d 400, 406-07 (Or. 1992).
67. See Diamond K Corp. v. Leon County, 677 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per
curiam) (stating that a taking claim requires proof that government-caused flooding "permanently
deprived" owner of "all beneficial use of its property"); Caponi v. Carlson, 392 N.W.2d 591, 596
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) ("Such regulation does not amount to a taking unless it deprives the property of
all reasonable use.").
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on the owner's property rights. In United States v. Lynah,68 the
Supreme Court held that
where the government by the construction of a dam or other
public works so floods lands belonging to an individual as to
substantially destroy their value there is a taking within the
scope of the Fifth Amendment. While the government does
not directly proceed to appropriate the title, yet it takes away
the use and value; when that is done it is of little consequence
in whom the fee may be vested. 69
The Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council70 likewise declared broadly that a land-use regulation that
deprives the owner of all beneficial use of the land is a taking, as long as
state property law would have given the owner the right to conduct some
beneficial use on the property.7 1
However, the Court in Lucas also said that a land-use regulation can
be a taking even if it does not deprive the owner of all beneficial use.
Such a regulation is not always a taking, but a Court may find that the
burden amounts to a taking in light of, among other possible factors,
"[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant" and "the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations." 72 So even if flooding were like regulation,
courts would be wrong to say that flooding is a taking only if it prevents
all beneficial use. Courts would have to consider the impact on the
owner, the owner's expectations, and so on.
But, as I argued above, flooding is not like regulation. Flooding is a
direct physical entry and use by the government. As Loretto says, such
an invasion is a taking no matter "how minute the intrusion." 73 Again,
the extent of impairment, like the duration of the intrusion, is not
irrelevant. The greater the impairment, the more compensation required.
If the owner's use of the property is not impaired at all, then maybe no
compensation should be required. But that is not because the land was
not taken. It is because justice may not require compensation for a
taking that does not impair the owner's use at all. Of course, even then
justice may require compensating the owner for the rental value of the
land, however small that rental value might be.
68. 188 U.S. 445 (1903) (holding that flooding caused by dams on the Savannah River, both by
seepage and by overflowing, took a flooded plantation).
69. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903).
70. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
71. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-19 (1992).
72. Id. at 1019 n.8 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
73. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
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B. GOVERNMENT-CAUSED FLOODING MAY TAKE PROPERTY EVEN IF IT
DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGE THE PROPERTY
Some courts similarly maintain that government-caused flooding
may be a taking only if it substantially damages the property. 74 Even
while denying that the extent of damage determines whether flooding is
a taking, the Supreme Court hinted that damage must be substantial in
United States v. Cress when it said that "it is the character of the inva-
sion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage
is substantial, that determines the question whether it is a taking." 75
But takings claims generally do not require proof of damage to the
land. Such damage might be part of the compensation for a temporary
taking. But it is not the only sort of injury an owner might suffer. The
owner also loses the use of the land for a time. In fact, the loss of use is
the essence of compensation for a permanent taking. The loss of use
should likewise be compensable when the taking is not permanent. 76
The "character of the invasion" alone determines whether flooding is a
taking.
IV. GOVERNMENT-CAUSED FLOODING IS NOT A TAKING IF
THE COMMON LAW WOULD ALLOW SUCH FLOODING
WITHOUT LIABILITY
So thus far it would seem that any government-caused flooding
should require just compensation, because it does not matter how long or
frequent the flooding is, nor how extensive or damaging it is. That
would be bad news for government.
But there is another limiting principle. That is, no compensation is
required if the landowner would have had no right against such flooding
under state property law. 77 For example, the government does not take
property when it abates a nuisance, regardless of how much it impairs the
74. See e.g., Bensch v. Metropolitan Dade County, 798 F. Supp. 678, 684 (D. Fla. 1992); Leeth v.
United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 467, 485 (1991) ("The intermittent flooding complained of must be frequent,
inevitably recurring and proximately result in substantial damage in order to constitute a taking.");
State ex rel. Department of Transp. v. Hoebel, 594 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Okla. 1979) (holding that flooding
which is "severe enough so as to effectively destroy or impair the land's usefulness" may be a taking).
75. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).
76. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1948) (affirming award of rental
value as compensation for temporary possession of a laundry business); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378, 382-83 (1945) (holding that government must pay short-term rental
value of business premises taken temporarily).
77. See Arvo Van Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation: Unintended Physical Damages, 20 HASTINGS
L.J. 431, 448-49 (1968) ("[Ilnverse liability of public agencies is determined in the main by the
peculiarities of private law rules governing interference with 'surface waters,' 'flood waters,' and
'stream waters."').
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owner's use of the property and even if it requires a physical occupa-
tion. That is because the landowner has no right to maintain a nuisance
on her land. In fact, Lucas said that government regulation may deprive
an owner of all economically viable use of the land without requiring
compensation, if the only economically viable uses would not be within
the property owner's common law property rights. 78
Although Lucas dealt with common law restraints on an owner's use
of land, rather than intrusions on an owner's land authorized by the
common law, the principle is the same. 79 So if the government causes
flooding to which the owner's title was already subject under state
property law, then the government has not taken the owner's property.
Some flooding cases have acknowledged and applied this principle in
concluding that government-caused flooding is a taking only if one
would have been liable for such flooding under the common law. 80 But
a surprising number have concluded that the government may be liable
for a taking even if a private landowner would not have been liable for
trespass in identical circumstances. 81
A. GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF ESTATE
One reason asserted for requiring just compensation, even when the
common law would allow the flooding, is that the government has no
estate in land. Landowners sometimes may be privileged to cause
78. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) ("Where the State
seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that
the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.").
79. The Court also followed this reasoning long before Lucas in United States v. Kansas City Life
Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950), a case involving intrusion on land rather than regulatory restraint of land
use. The Court held that building a lock and dam on a navigable waterway did not take flooded land
because the government's power to manage waterways was an existing limitation on private property
rights.
80. See, e.g., Tarzia v. Town of Hingham, 622 N.E.2d 1372 (Mass. 1993) (applying reasonable
use test to overflow of a town river and pond); Fragopoulos v. Rent Control Bd., 557 N.E.2d 1153,
1157 (Mass. 1990) ("[Tlhe government is not required to compensate an individual for denying him
the right to use that which he has never owned." (quoting Flynn v. Cambridge, 418 N.E.2d 335 (Mass.
1981)); Heins Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 686 n.6, 691
(Mo. 1993) (en banc) (stating that common law surface water rules apply to inverse condemnation
claims); Masley v. City of Lorain, 358 N.E.2d 596 (Ohio 1976) (applying common law rules to
determine whether city had taken property by flooding); Halverson v. Skagit County, 983 P.2d 643,
650-53 (Wash. 1999) (holding that county would not be liable for flooding caused by levees because
common enemy doctrine allowed deflecting surface waters from overflowing river).
81. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ramacher, 352 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Minn. 1984) (holding that the state may
not divert surface waters without liability even in circumstances where private owners could);
Department of Highways v. Feenan, 752 P.2d 182, 185 (Mont. 1988) (refusing to apply common
enemy doctrine to condemning authority); Board of Transp. v. Terminal Warehouse Corp., 268 S.E.2d
180, 183-84 (N.C. 1980) (holding that state agency must pay just compensation for flooding even if the
reasonable use rule would allow a private landowner to cause such flooding without liability).
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flooding on others' lands in order to enjoy their own land, but non-land-
owners have no right to cause flooding. So if the government causes
flooding as a non-landowner, then it has no common law right to do
s0. 82 Some cases have held that government-caused flooding was not a
taking because the government as landowner had the right to cause
the flooding, while suggesting that the government would have to pay
compensation for flooding it did not cause in its capacity as a
landowner. 83
These cases are right to say that not everyone is privileged to cause
flooding on private land. But they are wrong to say that the government
can cause flooding without compensation only when it acts as a land-
owner. Lucas did not say that the government could prevent land uses
only if they would interfere with the government's rights as a landowner.
Rather, the Court said that land-use regulations are not takings if they
"do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in
the courts-by adjacent landowners . . . under the State's law of private
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise."8 4 Much of
zoning restrains uses of property that would be private nuisances, not
public nuisances, and would not impair the use and enjoyment of any
land owned by the government. Just as the government may restrain
land uses without compensation if an adjacent landowner could do so,
the government may cause flooding for the benefit of private landown-
ers if they could have done so themselves.
B. COLLECTIVE ACTION
Of course, government-caused flooding may be on a much larger
scale than privately caused flooding. When the government restrains
private land use that would be a private nuisance, the landowner is not
restrained any more than she would be restrained by a common law
nuisance action. But the government often collects and diverts water in a
way that private landowners could not have. For example, private land-
owners hypothetically might be able to coordinate their actions to build
a flood wall, using covenants and easements and maybe an owners'
association to own and maintain the improvements. But such a project
82. See Wilson, 352 N.W.2d at 394 ("While a private landowner may reasonably divert surface
waters off his property, even to the detriment of another landowner, the state ordinarily may not,
because '[t]he state, in taking or damaging property by drainage proceedings, does not have the rights
of a landowner because it has no estate. It proceeds, not as an owner of property, but in the exercise
of sovereign right. That right is conditioned upon compensation."' (citation omitted)).
83. See White v. Pima County, 775 P.2d 1154, 1159-60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that county
had right as landowner to divert floodwater by building berms around county landfills).
84. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
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would be practically impossible because of transaction costs, uncoopera-
tive owners, and other such impediments, even if local land-use
regulation would not prevent such a project. So government action may
produce a greater invasion of property than private actions under the
common law realistically would produce.
Still, if a group of individual owners could cause the same result
without liability, the government should be able to do the same on their
behalf, even though individuals might be less likely to coordinate their
actions and cause greater flooding in concert. Facilitating such collec-
tive action and overcoming practical impediments is a big part of what
government does, after all. 85
C. CONFLICT WITH JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE
Some courts have reasoned that the Just Compensation Clause, or a
state counterpart, supersedes common law rules regarding privileged
flooding. So even though a private owner would not have been liable
for flooding in identical circumstances, the government must pay just
compensation because the constitutional requirement takes priority. 86
But even though constitutional provisions certainly do supersede con-
flicting common law rules, the common law rules do not conflict with the
Just Compensation Clause. In fact, as Lucas explains, the common law
rules define what is property for which compensation must be paid.
There is no independent constitutional definition of property. So the
common law rules defining property cannot possibly be superseded by
the Just Compensation Clause. The Just Compensation Clause only
requires compensation for taking away from the owner a right described
by such a rule. The common law rules concerning flooding are part of
the rules defining an owner's property rights in the land. The Just
Compensation Clause therefore requires the government to pay compen-
sation only when it floods land in a way that an owner is not subject to
under the common law.
85. The government can also facilitate collective action by authorizing landowners to form
districts with certain governmental powers. See, e.g., Halverson v. Skagit County, 983 P.2d 643, 646
(Wash. 1999) (describing powers of statutory diking districts).
86. See Terminal Warehouse Corp., 268 S.E.2d at 183-84 ("Where the interference with surface
waters is effected by [the government], the principle of reasonable use . . . is superseded by the
constitutional mandate that '(w)hen private property is taken for public use, just compensation must be
paid."' (citation omitted)); 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 208 (1999) ("[A] body possessing the
right to exercise the power of eminent domain is required to make compensation for damages to land
not taken resulting from the obstruction or diversion of, or other interference with, the natural flow of
surface water, by a public improvement, although a private landowner would not be liable in damages
under the same circumstances, upon the ground that such obstruction, diversion, or interference is a
taking or damaging of such land within the meaning of a constitutional provision requiring
compensation to be made on the taking or damaging of private property for public use.").
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D. RESULTING LIMITS TO GOVERNMENT-CAUSED FLOODING
1. Managing Navigable Waterways
The government therefore can cause flooding on private land
without compensating the owner if the common law would permit such
flooding without liability for trespass. But before discussing what the
common law permits, the government has the right to cause at least one
type of uncompensable flooding that private individuals could not cause
under the common law: flooding pursuant to the government's power
to manage navigable waterways. The owner's rights in riparian land are
limited by the right of the public to use the stream in the interest of
navigation. In United States v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co.,87 the
Supreme Court recognized this power:
It is not the broad constitutional power to regulate commerce,
but rather the servitude derived from that power and narrower
in scope, that frees the Government from liability in these
cases. When the Government exercises this servitude, it is
exercising its paramount power in the interest of navigation,
rather than taking the private property of anyone. The
owner's use of property riparian to a navigable stream long has
been limited by the right of the public to use the stream in the
interest of navigation. 88
If the government causes flooding on riparian land below the high-water
mark in exercising its power to manage navigation, the government is
simply exercising a right that is a pre-existing limitation on rights in
private land.89 Therefore no compensation is required, regardless of
how burdensome the flooding may be.
In other circumstances, however, state common law rules governing
private landowners will determine what flooding requires compen-
sation. 90 Depending on the jurisdiction, those rules may differ for
87. 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
88. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 807 (1950) (holding that federal
government took agricultural land by building lock and dam on navigable river that caused
under-flooding of land).
89. See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509 (1945) ("Lands below that
level [high-water mark] are subject always to a dominant servitude in the interests of navigation and
its exercise calls for no compensation.").
90. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council:
The Categorical and Other "Exceptions" to Liability for Fifth Amendment Takings of Private Property
Far Outweigh the "Rule, " 29 ENVTL. L. 939, 958-60 (1999) (discussing Court's deference to state law
in determining background principles of property law).
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surface water, flood water from a watercourse, and water diverted from a
watercourse.
2. Diverting a Watercourse
States generally agree that obstructing or diverting a watercourse is
a nuisance. 91 Therefore, the government should have to pay just com-
pensation when it obstructs or diverts a watercourse and thereby causes
flooding on private land.
3. Floodwater from a Watercourse
Some states have different rules for floodwater that overflows from
a watercourse and floodwater that is diffuse on the ground. 92 In Califor-
nia, for example, a landowner may freely protect her property from
water that overflows the banks of a lake or stream without liability to
other landowners, but may not interfere with the flow of diffuse surface
water.93 In such a jurisdiction, the government could build levees and
dikes to contain overflowing water and never have to pay compensation
to owners whose land is flooded as a result.
4. Surface Water
There are three different common law rules regarding when a
landowner may divert surface water without liability to other landowners
for flooding that results: the civil law rule, the common enemy rule, and
the reasonable use rule.
In civil law states, a landowner is strictly liable for damage resulting
from altering the natural drainage of diffuse surface water. 94 The civil
91. See, e.g., White v. Pima County, 775 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Schulze v.
Monsanto Co., 782 S.W.2d 419, 420 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that one is liable for any damage
caused by obstructing a natural watercourse, but may deflect surface waters as a common enemy
without liability as long as reasonable and with due care); O'Dell v. McKenzie, 145 S.E.2d 388, 390
(W. Va. 1965).
92. See White, 775 P.2d at 1157 ("Flood waters are distinguished from surface waters by the fact
that the former have broken away from a stream, while the latter have not yet become part of a
watercourse." (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Proebstel, 150 P.2d 81, 83 (Ariz. 1944)). But see Brown
v. H & D Duenne Farms, Inc., 799 S.W.2d 621, 627 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (applying the same rules to
overflowing waters and diffuse surface waters).
93.
First, one has no right to obstruct the flow onto his land of what are technically known as
surface waters .... Second, one has the right to protect himself against flood waters ...
and for that purpose to obstruct their flow onto his land, and this even though such
obstruction causes the water to flow onto the land of another .... Third, one may not
obstruct or divert the flow of a natural watercourse.
Weaver v. Bishop, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1351, 1353-54 (1988) (citations omitted).
94. See Fisher v. Space of Pensacola, Inc., 483 So. 2d 392, 393 (Ala. 1986); Dougan v. Rossville
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law rule "recognizes a natural servitude of natural drainage as between
adjoining lands, so that the lower owner must accept the surface water
which naturally drains onto his land but, on the other hand, the upper
owner cannot change the natural drainage so as to increase the natural
burden." 95 In such states, the government would always have to pay
compensation when altering natural drainage of surface water causes
flooding.
In common enemy states, on the other hand, landowners can deflect
water freely without liability for flooding on others' land.96 Under such
a rule, the government could likewise cause flooding by diverting sur-
face water without compensating those whose land is flooded. 97 How-
ever, courts have modified the modern common enemy rule by limiting
the right to deflect surface water in some ways. For example, common
enemy jurisdictions generally agree that surface waters may not be
artificially collected and discharged upon adjoining lands. 98
The great majority of states follow the reasonable use rule, in effect
if not by name. 99 In these states, the government would be required to
pay compensation for flooding resulting from diversion of surface water
if the diversion was unreasonable.100 The reasonable use rule requires a
court to balance the need for the diversion, by the means used, against
the burden on the receiving land.101 Courts list as many as a dozen
factors to consider in weighing these two interests against each other. In
North Dakota, the reasonable use rule is stated as follows:
Therefore, drainage of surface waters complies with the reasona-
ble use rule if: (a) There is a reasonable necessity for such
drainage; (b) If reasonable care be taken to avoid unnecessary
injury to the land receiving the burden; (c) If the utility or
benefit accruing to the land drained reasonably outweighs the
gravity of the harm resulting to the land receiving the burden;
and (d) If, where practicable, it is accomplished by reasonably
Drainage Dist., 757 P.2d 272, 275 (Kan. 1988); Powers v. Judd, 553 A.2d 139, 140 (Vt. 1988).
95. Midgett v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 132 S.E.2d 599, 603 (N.C. 1963).
96. See, e.g., Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ind. 1982); Department of Highways
v. Feenan, 752 P.2d 182, 184 (Mont. 1988).
97. See Halverson v. Skagit County, 983 P.2d 643, 650-53 (Wash. 1999) (holding that county
would not be liable for flooding caused by levees because common enemy doctrine allowed deflecting
surface waters from overflowing river).
98. See, e.g., DiBlasi v. City of Seattle, 969 P.2d 10, 16 (Wash. 1998).
99. See Heins Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 690 &
n.13 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
100. See Triangle Ctr., Inc. v. Department of Public Works, 438 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. 1982)
(concluding that reasonable use standard should apply to public ways as well as private land); Heins
Implement, 859 S.W.2d at 691.
101. See, e.g., Tucker v. Badoian, 384 N.E.2d 1195, 1201 (Mass. 1978) (Kaplan, J., concurring)
(stating that in future cases only unreasonable interferences with surface water flow would be
actionable, in light of the amount of the harm, the foreseeability of the harm, the purpose and motive
of the possessor, and other relevant factors).
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improving and aiding the normal and natural system of drain-
age according to its reasonable carrying capacity, or if, in the
absence of a practicable natural drain, a reasonable and feasible
artificial drainage system is adopted.102
I argued above that generally a physical taking is compensable
regardless of how much it helps the public or how much it hurts the
owner. In contrast, a regulatory taking requires a comparison of public
need and private burden.103 But in a way, the application of the reasona-
ble use rule to takings by diversion of surface waters requires just such a
balancing of public benefit against private burden. If the public need is
great enough, flooding another's land might be reasonable under the
common law, depending on how invasive the flooding is. So the Lucas
principle applied in these circumstances makes floodwater takings
similar to regulatory takings after all.
E. ADAPTING COMMON LAW RULES
Some of these rules, like the common enemy rule for surface water,
may seem to unfairly burden individual landowners. That may be a
problem with the common law rule, not a problem unique to govern-
ment-caused flooding. But in some circumstances it may seem that the
rule should be different for the government. For this reason, California
courts have departed from the common law rules when the government
causes flooding. The California Supreme Court has reasoned that the
policy considerations allowing private landowners to protect their land
from floodwaters without liability are not the same when the government
builds flood control improvements or otherwise alters natural drainage
patterns in a way that causes flooding. Even if the landowner would
have been subject to flooding by private owners, the court has said the
purpose of the state just compensation clause is simply to require the
public to share the burden of public improvements.1 04 Because the
102. Martin v. Weckerly, 364 N.W.2d 93,95 (N.D. 1985).
103. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) ("Although no precise rule
determines when property has been taken, the question necessarily requires a weighing of private and
public interests."); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-16 (1922) ("If we were called
upon to deal with the plaintiffs' position alone we should think it clear that the statute does not disclose
a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally
protected rights.").
104. See Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 867 P.2d 724, 747 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (holding that
common law privilege of riparian owner to increase volume and velocity of natural watercourse by
discharging surface waters and altering stream bed did not apply to government defendants, but
government may be liable for flooding resulting from such activities if the government acted
unreasonably by not using reasonably available alternatives, or if the watercourse was made part of a
public drainage system); Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist., 764 P.2d 1070, 1079-80 (Cal.
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common law does subject landowners to some risk of flooding, however,
the government must pay compensation only when it acts "unreason-
ably" by not using "alternative or mitigating measures" that could
avoid the flooding. 105 Reasonableness is determined by considering all
the circumstances of each case, including the public benefit of the
improvement causing the flooding, the alternatives available to the gov-
ernment, the availability and cost of protective measures that the private
owner could have taken, and the extent, foreseeability, and uniqueness of
the burden on the private owner. 106
Even though it may seem strange that common law principles may
allow the government to decide winners and losers from a flood control
project without compensating the losers, doing so clearly disregards
Lucas. Rather than ignoring the principle of Lucas, courts can achieve
the same result within the common law itself. The common law rules are
flexible and can adapt to the circumstances of the case and the parties.
In recent decades, many courts have changed their common law rules
concerning floodwaters. The trend has been to recognize a need for
balancing the harms and benefits to the competing landowners, as
required by the reasonable use rule.107 The common law rules certainly
could be further adapted to be sensitive to the unique burdens that may
be imposed by the government, as well as the government's greater
ability to spread costs among those benefited by the flooding. The
reasonable use rule is especially well adapted to such considerations.108
In fact, all the reasonableness considerations identified by the California
cases could justifiably be considered in applying the reasonable use rule.
V. COMPENSATION FOR LOST MARKET VALUE BEFORE
FLOODING
So the government must pay just compensation for flooding it
causes on private land unless the common law would have allowed such
flooding without liability. But landowners may suffer substantial loss
1988) (en banc) ("Inverse condemnation liability ultimately rests on the notion that the private
individual should not be required to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of a public
improvement."); Holtz v. Superior Court, 475 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1970) (en banc).
105. Locklin, 867 P.2d at 749; see also Belair, 764 P.2d at 1079.
106. See Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 99 (Cal. 1997) (applying
same reasoning to cases involving diversion of watercourses for flood control); Locklin, 867 P.2d at
749-50; Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 398 P.2d 129, 136-37 (Cal. 1965) (en banc); Van Alstyne,
supra note 77, at 455.
107. See Heins Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 689
(Mo. 1993) (en banc) ("Over the years, through the accretion of complementary exceptions and
qualifications, the two doctrines [the civil law rule and the common enemy rule] have been laboriously
drifting towards confluence-and, not coincidentally, toward the [reasonable use rule].").
108. See id. at 690 ("The greatest virtue of the reasonable use standard is its ability to adapt to
any set of circumstances while remaining firmly focused on the equities of the situation.").
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before flooding ever occurs. If the government builds a levee, for
example, the market value of a house on the unprotected side may drop
steeply.109 Undeveloped property may become practically undevelop-
able. Even though the property was always subject to some risk of flood-
ing under the common law, a merely hypothetical risk of future flood
control projects, public or private, would obviously impair market value
much less than the virtual certainty of future flooding that comes with a
completed flood control project. The market value would drop even if
the law would indisputably require the government to pay compensation
once the land floods, so that the market might be expected to anticipate
such compensation. Even with the promise of compensation, an owner
could never be entirely certain of prevailing on a future takings claim, or
of recovering all the actual losses that the owner might suffer. Further-
more, flooding imposes on an owner substantial costs for which she
would not be compensated under the Fifth Amendment, such as the emo-
tional and social costs of being uprooted from one's home.110 So if two
houses are otherwise identical, the market will surely value less the one
that is much more likely to be flooded at some point and will require
repair or relocation, even if the government might ultimately pay every
penny of out-of-pocket cost.
The owners of such property might justly complain that they are
forced to suffer substantial loss, for which the Fifth Amendment promis-
es compensation, yet they cannot recover that compensation until the
flooding actually occurs. The flooding may actually occur many years
later, after the owners have had to sell their home at a substantial loss,
such as if they relocate to another city. Yet under the theory I have been
arguing, the act that takes the owners' property is the physical invasion
by water. So the owners' property is not taken until the water physically
invades, and the owners have no right to compensation until then.
This has been the rule in the courts. For example, in Cloutier v.
United States, Il the Federal Circuit denied pre-flood compensation
because "[rielief cannot be granted on the mere possibility that there
may be a taking at some point in the future. . . . [Such relief] would
improperly be based on speculation and conjecture."112 The Cloutiers
did cite one old case granting pre-flood compensation, Kincaid v. United
109. See United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, More or Less, 80 F.3d 1074, 1076 (5th Cir. 1996)
(summarizing expert testimony on reduced market value due to location on unprotected side of levee).
110. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) ("[L]oss to the owner of
nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it...
is properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship.").
I 1. No. 90-5090, 1991 WL 93077 (Fed. Cir. June 3, 1991).
112. Cloutier v. United States, No. 90-5090, 1991 WL 93077, at *1-2 (Fed. Cir. June 3, 1991).
[VOL. 76:785808
2000] TAKINGS BY FLOODWATERS 809
States.' 13 In that case, the court reasoned simply that "[i]t cannot be
that, if the owner is entitled to compensation, he must wait until an
overflow comes."1 14 But apparently other courts have not agreed.' 15
The landowner's plight is similar to that of one who suffers a loss of
market value because of the government's publicized intention to con-
demn some part of the property. Such a landowner generally cannot
recover compensation until the government actually takes the property,
even though the landowner suffers loss of market value immediately. 16
To make things worse for owners, some courts strictly apply the
general rule that the required compensation is measured by the fair mar-
ket value on the day of the actual taking. These courts reason that any
loss in market value preceding the actual taking is not compensable, even
if the owners prove that the loss of market value was due to market antici-
pation of the taking. 137 So if the market value of a home drops from
$150,000 to $100,000 because the market anticipates flooding due to
a government flood control project, the owner would only recover
$100,000 when the flooding actually occurs and the land is thereby
actually taken.
In other contexts, however, some courts have compensated owners
for lost market value preceding the actual taking of their property but
caused by anticipation of future condemnation.] 18 Still, even if the
133. 37 F.2d 602 (W.D. La. 1929), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S.
95(1932).
114. Id. at 608. In Department of Highways v. Feenan, 752 P.2d 182, 185 (Mont. 1988), the
Montana Supreme Court also suggested that property owners should be able to recover compensation
before flooding occurs. The court did not discuss this issue, but held that the trial court erred by not
giving the following instruction: "You are instructed that if reconstruction by Plaintiff has caused a
condition which has or will produce intermittent but inevitable recurring flooding, then Defendants
should be justly compensated by said Plaintiffs, or Plaintiff for the depreciation if any, to the fair
market value of Defendants' property resulting therefrom." Id.
115. See State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. Horine, 776 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Mo.
1989) (en banc) ("[W]here a landowner whose property is not being condemned anticipates damage
to his property as the result of a condemnation, he ... may not be compensated until damage actually
occurs."); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Lynch, 297 S.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Mo. 1956).
116. See Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939) ("A reduction or increase in the
value of property may occur by reason of legislation for or the beginning or completion of a project.
Such changes in value are incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a 'taking' in the
constitutional sense.").
117. See Housing Auth. v. Schroeder, 151 S.E.2d 226, 227 (Ga. 1966) (holding that trial court
erred by instructing jury that it could consider lost rents before date of actual taking in deciding
condemnation award); Thompson v. Department of Transp., 433 S.E.2d 623, 624 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
("Alleged losses or diminution in the fair market value of property attributable to an anticipated
condemnation are not compensable elements of damage or a taking resulting from the exercise of
eminent domain authority .... ").
118. See 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1-604 (1997) ("Any change in the fair market value prior to the
date of condemnation which the condemnor or condemnee establishes was substantially due to the
general knowledge of the imminence of condemnation, other than that due to physical deterioration of
the property within the reasonable control of the condemnee, shall be disregarded in determining fair
market value."); Ehrlander v. State Dept. of Transp. & Public Facilities, 797 P.2d 629, 635 (Alaska
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landowner ultimately may recover compensation for all market value lost
due to the government's flood control project, that may not help much
if the landowner has to wait until flooding occurs. That may not happen
for ten years, during which time she cannot sell her property except at a
substantial loss. There is little chance that a buyer would pay the full
amount that the property was worth before the government's flood con-
trol project, even with the expectation of full compensation when flood-
ing did eventually occur. So the important question for landowners is
whether there is some way to receive just compensation for the lost value
of their property as soon as they feel the market effects of the
government's actions, rather than waiting for flooding to occur.
A. REGULATORY TAKING
One argument for immediate, pre-flood compensation would be
that the government's flood control project (or whatever else the govern-
ment might have done to create the expectation of future flooding) is
like a regulatory taking. While government-caused flooding is a physi-
cal taking, there might also be an earlier regulatory-type taking when the
government creates that risk by its actions. The government's actions
increasing the risk of flooding practically, though not legally, restrain
the use, enjoyment, and value of the owner's property in the present.
Although apparently no flooding case has followed this reasoning,
some similar cases have. The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example,
has held that the government takes property when the government
declares its intention to condemn land, and that intention becomes
"fixed and irreversible."1 19 In Textron, Inc. v. Wood,120 the court
reasoned that the government already "substantially interfered" with the
property, thus taking it, when the government's "unequivocal inten-
tion" to take the property "effectively arrested" the owner's "capacity
to freely dispose of that property."121 Even though the government did
1990) (stating that valuation date for condemnation should be date on which unequivocal intention to
condemn deprives the owner of the economic advantages of ownership); Township of West Windsor
v. Nierenberg, 695 A.2d 1344, 1357 (N.J. 1997) (applying statute in fixing valuation date for
condemned property on date that government action substantially affected the use and enjoyment of
the property); Lange v. State, 547 P.2d 282, 286 (Wash. 1976) ("[A]ny decrease in property value
attributable to the project for which the eminent domain proceeding is instituted is to be disregarded in
computing just compensation. This rule also applies to situations in which the condemnation activities
themselves have depreciated property prior to the institution of formal eminent domain proceedings.").
119. Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 355 A.2d 307, 315-16 (Conn. 1974); see also Santini v. Connecticut
Hazardous Waste Management Serv., 739 A.2d 680, 690-91 (Conn. 1999).
120. 355 A.2d 307 (Conn. 1974).
121. Textron, 355 A.2d at 316; see also Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 665-66 (E.D.
Mich. 1966) (holding that pre-condemnation urban renewal plans and actions "which substantially
contributed to and accelerated the decline in value of plaintiffs' property constituted a 'taking' of
plaintiffs' property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, for which just compensation must be
paid"), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
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not legally restrain development of the property, the government's
declared intention had the same effect of depriving the owner of use and
enjoyment of the property.
Making physical improvements that will eventually lead to flooding
is even more "fixed and irreversible" than the government's mere
declarations of intent. Although the government could remove or alter
the improvements in the future before flooding results, that seems
less likely than deciding not to proceed with an openly declared con-
demnation plan. Certainly, building such improvements itself is an
unequivocal commitment to the consequences that follow from such
improvements.
But if a fixed intention to condemn is like a regulatory restraint on
land use, then it should be a taking only if it makes the property nearly
useless and thus goes "too far."1 22 The court in Textron said that a
declared intention to condemn would be a taking only if it "sub-
stantially interfered" with the property.123 Similarly, some courts have
held that a planning map or other pre-condemnation indication of intent
may take property before the land is actually condemned, but only if the
government's actions effectively deprived the owner "of all or
substantial economic use of his property."1 24
Having to prove such a drastic loss of value would severely limit the
recovery of advance compensation for lost market value resulting from
government improvements. Property owners might argue that, despite
the analogy to regulatory takings, they should not have to show such a
drastic loss of value, because it is not mere interference with property use
that constitutes a taking. Rather, it is the government's irreversible
actions that will lead to a physical taking by floodwaters in the future.
That future physical taking will require compensation even if it does not
deprive the owner of all beneficial use of the property. 125 The present
interference with property use is simply the reason to treat the future
condemnation as if it already happened. So owners of property subject
to flooding risk would not have to argue that the government must pay
just compensation every time it does something that substantially impairs
market value. Obviously, the government takes all sorts of actions, like
locating roads, buildings, and other public improvements, that may
122. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
123. Textron, 355 A.2d at 316.
124. Department of Transp. v. Weisenfeld, 617 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see
also Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1977)
("When a public entity acting in furtherance of a public project directly and substantially interferes
with property rights and thereby significantly impairs the value of the property, the result is a taking in
the constitutional sense and compensation must be paid.").
125. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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impair market value. Such lost market value is not compensable; it is
just an inherent risk of property ownership.126 But if the government
action will itself "irreversibly" become a physical taking in the future,
as flood control improvements may but other public improvements will
not, then the impairment of market value may be considered a present
taking.
B. FLOODING EASEMENT
Another argument, which avoids the confusion with regulatory
takings, contrasts the flooding case with the usual case in which the mar-
ket anticipates future condemnation. In the usual case, the government
has not yet taken any action, except maybe somehow communicating its
intentions for the future. So the market value drops because the market
is assessing the risk of future action. In the flooding case, on the other
hand, the government has taken action. The government has actually
constructed improvements that will almost certainly cause flooding at
some point in the future. The only question is when. It might be five
years or it might be a hundred years. That action by the government
might be thought to inherently carry with it an easement over whatever
lands it will flood in anticipated circumstances. 127
In Kincaid v. United States,128 the Western District of Louisiana
followed similar reasoning. The government was undertaking a flood
control project on the Mississippi River that would at some point increase
flooding on the plaintiff's land because his land would be on the
unprotected side of a levee. The court reasoned that
the physical occupancy of the ground in this case will not take
place until and when it is overflowed by water in time of flood;
but the process of subjecting it to that service and the taking
possession, in so far as is either necessary or contemplated by
the act, will begin with the construction of the first levee or
works which are intended to direct the water upon the land.129
The court therefore required just compensation for the land even though
it had not yet been flooded.
126. See, e.g., Orfield v. Housing & Redev. Auth., 232 N.W.2d 923, 927 (Minn. 1975) (holding
that lost market value due to urban renewal project in area of claimant's property was not a taking).
127. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully made this argument in Cloutier v. United States, No. 90-5090,
1991 WL 93077, at *1-*2 (Fed. Cir. June 3, 1991).
128. 37 F.2d 602 (W.D. La. 1929), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S.
95 (1932).
129. Kincaid v. United States, 37 F.2d 602, 608 (W.D. La. 1929), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932).
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Other courts have not followed this reasoning. One major reason
that courts have not required compensation in usual cases of anticipated
condemnation is that the government should not have to pay compensa-
tion until it finally takes action. The government's plans may change, so
it should not have to pay compensation until it actually follows through
with its plans.130 But that reason does not apply to flooding anticipation.
The government has already followed through with the actions that will
ultimately lead to the taking. The market is not gambling on what the
government will do in the future. The market is gambling on nature.
The uncertainty is when the floods will come.
Of course, the government might decide to remove or modify the
improvements, or other conditions might change, with the result that no
flooding ever occurs. 131 But at least the government has done some-
thing, and it has had a real and predictable effect on the value of an
owner's property. That certainly makes the case different from usual
anticipated condemnation cases.
A few cases dealing with severance damages seem to have been
sensitive to this argument, without quite articulating it. When the govern-
ment condemns land for a levee or whatever, just compensation usually
includes not only the market value of the property condemned, but also
"severance" damages to the remainder of the owner's property not
condemned resulting from the partial condemnation. 132 A few courts
have allowed such severance damages for lost market value due to
expected flooding on the portion of the owner's land not taken by the
government.133 They've done so despite the uncertainty about whether
flooding would actually occur and how extensive the flooding might be.
Of course, a court would have to go even further to award compen-
sation solely for lost market value due to anticipation of future flooding.
In the severance cases, the government clearly has taken private property,
and the court is just deciding how much the government must pay for
130. See Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939) (stating that the government has no
obligation to pay compensation until the property is actually taken, because the government has the
right to "discontinue or abandon" its plans without liability for compensation).
131. See id. at 286 (suggesting that flood control improvements can make government liable for a
taking only when the private owner "actually experience[s]" a "burden . . . of caring for floods
greater than it bore prior to the construction").
132. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943) (describing severance damages).
133. See United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that in determining severance damages from taking, factfinder may consider prospective buyer's
increased fear of flooding on property not taken); State v. Hawkins, No. 91C-10-183-WTQ, 1995 WL
717407 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1995) (stating that just compensation must include lost market value
of retained portion of parcel due to flooding on condemned parcel); State ex rel. Missouri Highway &
Transp. Comm'n v. Horine, 776 S.W.2d 6, 11-12 (Mo. 1989) (en banc) (allowing condemnee to
recover lost market value of remainder not taken due to risk of flooding, as long as condemnee's
taken property was part of project that created risk of flooding).
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the property. When the government has not taken any of the owner's
land for the flood control project, the owner must argue that the lost
market value due to anticipated flooding itself amounts to a taking, not
just that it is an additional increment of just compensation.
There is some precedent for such an argument, though. In Bor-
mann v. Board of Supervisors,134 the Iowa Supreme Court held that
Iowa's right-to-farm statute was invalid as a taking of private property.
The statute itself did not claim title to any land, nor did it directly
restrain the use of private property. The statute just gave farms the right
to conduct farm operations without liability for nuisances. Even though
the plaintiffs had suffered no such nuisance yet, the court held that
merely giving another the right to invade one's property rights is a
present taking.135 The court did not require any proof that the statute
deprived the plaintiffs of beneficial use of their property. The court
instead relied on a physical takings theory, even though no physical
taking had occurred yet. The government had simply created the
possibility-or perhaps near certainty-by passing the right-to-farm
statute.
In the flooding case, the government does not formally create a
legal right to flood land. But it does take action that creates the possibil-
ity or near certainty of a physical invasion in the future. Of course, in
the right-to-farm case, the government created the right to conduct
nuisances without liability. In the flooding cases, on the other hand, the
government does not necessarily claim it can cause flooding without
liability. It may instead construct its improvements and acknowledge its
liability for whatever actual takings may result in the future.
Whatever the theory, a property owner should be able to recover full
compensation for loss of market value as soon as it happens, if it results
not from market speculation about what the government will do, but
from market assessment of flooding risk arising from completed govern-
ment improvements. Maybe the property will never flood, or the market
will over-estimate the severity of flooding, but the government should
bear that risk when it creates the problem at the expense of the private
landowner. The risk of flooding harms the property in the present,
regardless of whether flooding ever occurs. 136 The government caused
134. 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998).
135. Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 322 (Iowa 1998).
136. Cf. Horine, 776 S.W.2d at 12 ("[T]he depreciation in market value due to a risk of harm is
recoverable in a condemnation proceeding [claiming severance damages to remainder not taken]; it is
the risk of harm which diminishes the market value of the land, not the absolute likelihood of the
feared event occurring.") (citing Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Juergens, 760 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Mo.
1988)).
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that injury in the process of serving the public's interest, so the public
should bear that loss rather than the innocent landowner.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the government causes water to invade private land, the
government's inanimate agent physically enters and occupies the land.
To that extent the water also dispossesses the owner. This takes land in
the same way that the government might take land by constructing a
building on private land, whether permanent or temporary. It makes no
difference that human agents of the government might not have entered
the land. That is not the only way to physically seize land. Nor does it
make a difference that the government might not have intended to take
the land.
If the government takes the land by such a physical invasion, the
government should be required to pay compensation in the same way
that it must pay compensation for other physical invasions. That means
that the government must pay compensation regardless of how long or
frequent the flooding is, although the duration and frequency will
certainly affect the amount of compensation. That also means that the
government must pay compensation regardless of how much damage the
flood causes, although that too affects the amount of compensation.
However, the government does not have to compensate the owner if
the owner was already subject to such flooding under the common law.
Those common law rules in some cases may seem to allow the govern-
ment to unfairly burden individuals for the public's benefit without
paying any compensation. But the common law rules are flexible and
can adapt to cases involving the government, recognizing the greater
risks of flooding from the government and the government's ability to
spread those risks. Adapting the common law rules to the factual
context seems like a better approach than treating flooding as a unique
type of taking that is not quite a physical seizure and not quite a regula-
tion. There is no good principled reason that flooding should not be a
compensable taking whenever another type of physical invasion would
be.
But there is a good reason for treating flooding differently from
other physical invasions when it comes to awarding compensation. With
other physical seizures, the government clearly does not take property
until it actually occupies the land with improvements or people. Even if
the government announces its intention to do so in the future, the
government may change its plans. But with takings by floodwaters, the
government may completely execute its plans by which it will take
20001
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private land, yet the flooding may not occur for years afterwards. In
such a case, the owner should be entitled to just compensation for the
present lost property value resulting from the increased risk of flooding.
The owner should not have to bear such real losses indefinitely even
though they are properly compensable under the Just Compensation
Clause.
